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Abstract 
The paper finds that trade is insignificant in explaining income inequality. The 
results also suggest institutions are good for inequality mitigation for a larger 
sample of developed and developing countries. Though, the results do not 
change for some institutions like rule of law when the sample is restricted to 
developing countries. However, for other institutions like democracy and 
autocracy, the author finds that former is positively related with inequality and 
later is negatively related. The results shed light on the fact that transition to 
democracies come with higher risks for the developing countries and stable 
economies even with autocratic setup may have more equal societies when 
compared to newly adopted democratic set ups.   
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1. Introduction: 
Many recent studies show that institutions and integration are endogenous (i.e., 
Rodrik et al, 2004) whereas there are issues of two way causality between 
inequality and institutions (i.e., see Keefer, 2002; Chong and Gradstein, 2004). 
Chong and Gradstein (2004) find strong evidence of bi-directional causality 
between institutions and inequality. Inequality may affect the quality of 
institutions. For example, high inequality will prevent the poor from investing 
in education or the ruling class may not invest in education so that the poor 
majority will not be politically active thus undermining the development of 
necessary social and political institutions. Easterly (2001) and Keefer (2002) 
suggests that social polarisation negatively affects institutional quality. The 
countries with poor institutions are also likely to have high inequality. For 
example in Russia in the 1990s, a small group of entrepreneurs exploited their 
political power to promote their own interests, subverting the emergence of 
institutions committed to the protection of smaller share holders and 
businesses. According to the Corruption Perceptions Index published by 
Transparency International, among the transition economies, Estonia is placed 
28, and Hungary 31; whereas Russia is placed 79, and Ukraine 83. In these 
transition economies, weak performance of public institutions, infringement of 
property rights in favour of influential parties, lower willingness to use courts 
to resolve business disputes, lower level of tax compliance and higher levels of 
bribery all have been strongly correlated with inequality. Similarly, in several 
Latin American countries, the ruling elites, the military and large businesses 
impeded smaller business interests giving rise to significant informal sector. 
Chong and Gradstein (2004) have shown that when the political bias in favour 
of the rich is large, income inequality and poor institutional quality may 
reinforce each other, indicating endogeniety between the two.  
 
 
2. Methodology 
Any empirical analysis which takes trade and institutions as pure exogenous 
factors while analysing their effects on inequality may lead to miss-
specification bias. We construct our inequality model in correspondence with 
the reduced form growth model proposed by Rodrik et al (2004) where trade 
and institutions are taken as endogenous to each other as well as the 
dependent variable which in our case is inequality. 
 
Our basic inequality equation would look like: 
 
Inequality = f (Institutions, Integration, Geography) …………......... (1) 
 
Here in line with Rodrik et al (2004), we assume geography is a pure 
exogenous concept. 
 
Much recently Kaufman et al (2002) formulated aggregate governance 
indicators for six dimensions of governance covering 175 countries.  They 
relied on 194 different measures of governance drawn from 17 different 
sources of subjective governance data constructed by 15 different sources 
including international organizations, political and business risk rating agencies, 
think tanks and non governmental organizations. The governance indicators 
have been oriented so that higher values correspond to better outcomes on a 
scale from -2.5 to 2.5. They are categorized as rule of law (Rl), political stability 
(Ps), regulatory quality (Rq), government effectiveness (Ge), voice and 
accountability (Va) and control of corruption (Ctc).  We add two more political 
indicators namely democracy (Demo) and autocracy (Auto) to our analysis from 
Polity dataset whereas, both ranging from 0 to 10.  
 
We incorporate concepts of openness and trade policy in our regression model 
in order to carry out a robustness check for our results while controlling for 
various definitions of institutions. The ratio of nominal imports plus exports 
to GDP (Lcopen) is the conventional openness indicator (see Frankel and 
Romer, 1999; Alcala and Ciccone, 2002; Rose, 2002; Dollar and Kraay, 2003; 
Rodrik et al, 2004). There are indicators of trade restrictiveness acting as 
measures of trade policy (Edwards, 1998; Greenaway et al, 2001, Rose 2002). 
Tariffs on intermediate inputs and capital goods (Owti), is considered as good 
proxy for trade restrictiveness and have also been employed in our study.  
 
To capture inequality we take GINI income inequality index (Gini) from 
UNU/WIDER World Income Inequality Database (WIID). 
 
Corresponding to equation 1, our inequality model is estimated as follows:  
 
iiii nIntegrationsInstitutioGini 1111 εχβα +++= .......................2 
 
The variable iGini is Gini Index in a country i, insInstitutio  and inIntegratio  
are respectively measures for institutions and general openness/trade policy 
and iε  is the random error term.  
 
As we have discussed, there are potential endogenity problems between 
institutions and integration and between institutions and inequality itself. To 
this effect we have first regress our institutional, trade policy and openness 
proxies on a set of instruments. Frankel and Romer (1999) suggests that we 
can instrument for openness by using trade/GDP shares constructed on the 
basis of a gravity equation for bilateral trade flows. Hall and Jones (1999) 
employed distance from the equator and the extent to which the primary 
languages of Western Europe are spoken as first languages today as 
instruments for institutions.  Hall and Jones made an argument that the 
instruments are not correlated with the error term. Thus following Dollar and 
Kraay (2003) and Hall and Jones (1999), we use ‘fractions of the population 
speaking English (Engfrac) and Western European languages as the first 
language (Eurfrac)’ as an instrument for legal, economic and political 
institutions. As in Rodrik et al (2004), we employ ‘distance from the equator’ 
as another instrument (proxy for geography) also employed by Hall and Jones 
(1999). 
 
iiiii DisteqFREurEngnsInstitutio 111111 Ε+++++= τϑθςσ ……………..3 
iiiii DisteqFREurEngnIntegratio 222222 Ε+++++= τϑθςσ ……….......4 
 
 
Where iEng  and iEur are our instruments for legal, economic and political 
institutions referring to fractions of population speaking English and 
European languages respectively. iFR is instrument for openness and trade 
policy. iDisteq  is proxy for geography showing distance from the equator. At 
the second stage the predicted values of respective institutional, openness and 
trade policy variables are employed in the inequality and income share 
equations.  The first stage results establish that the instruments are robust 
predictors. Higher order tests were also carried out toi further establish the 
strength of the instruments. (The results are available on request) 
 
3. Results 
Table 1 shows the results for openness with income inequality. There is no 
evidence of a significant relationship between openness and within country 
income inequality except for two cases (columns 3 and 4). Institutions 
including Rl, Va, Demo and Ge, are significantly and negatively related with 
income inequalities. Reducing the sample to developing countries only makes 
insignificance of trade more pronounced.  The relative significance of 
institutions has also declined. Another interesting observation comes forth. 
For a larger sample, including developed and developing countries, democracy 
is significantly and negatively related with the Gini, telling that democracies are 
more likely to put a downward pressure on income inequality. However when 
the sample is reduced for developing countries only (columns 9 and 10), the 
signs change in favour of autocracy. Now democracy is positively and 
significantly related with Gini and autocracy, which was insignificant for the 
larger sample, is significantly and negatively related with inequality. The result 
is simple to interpret. Democracies in developing countries are associated with 
higher income inequality and autocracies are associated with less income 
inequality. There are several reasons why democratic experience in developing 
countries is related with higher income inequality and why autocracies may in 
fact show a negative relationship.  First and foremost, there is a direct link 
between democracy and higher inequality because there is evidence that 
transition to a democracy in many developing countries have produced 
political instability, ethnic conflict and resultantly poor economic outcomes. 
(Kaplan, 2000; Zakaria, 2003; and Rodrik and Wacziarg, 2005) In literature 
there is also a distinction between real democracy (Populist democracy) and 
oligarchic society. (Acemoglu, 2003) In real democracy, the political power is 
more equally distributed among different social and income groups of the 
society and thus the poorer segments can use their political voice to implement 
pro poor tax system in the country. Also in a real democracy, implementation 
of property rights prevent barriers to entry as against oligarchic society, which 
may look like a democracy by holding elections but political power lies with 
economic elites who create monopoly positions in the domestic markets for 
their businesses and violate property rights. In this context, an autocratic set 
up, where the leaders have effectively implemented property rights and 
significantly improved the level playing field for all social groups to carry out 
good business practices, may lead to decrease in income inequality. (Glaser et 
al, 2004a; and 2004b)  
Table 2, shows the results based on Owti. They are similar to the ones already 
discussed above for Lcopen. For the larger sample of developed and developing 
countries, decrease in tariffs rates on international inputs and capital goods 
bring a significant decrease in income inequality. However, as for Lcopen, 
results remain highly case sensitive. Owti is only significant for 2 specifications 
(columns 15 and 16) out of total number of 14 specifications including the 
ones which represent results for reduced samples (developing country only).  
On basis of these results we cannot claim with surety that trade is significantly 
related with income inequality. The results on institutions in table 2 are same 
as observed in table 1, which serves as further robustness check. The results 
suggest that for both developed and developing countries, well developed 
institutions whether Rl, Va, Demo or Ge mitigates income inequality but if the 
sample is reduced to developing countries only, we find that autocracies now 
represent more equal societies while democracies represent rise in inequality. 
The last result, as we argue, is due to the fact that most developing countries 
are new democracies and the transitions have been risky with negative fall outs 
on equality.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
Well developed institutions are important for inequality mitigation. However, 
there is a caveat. The first assertion is only true when both developed and 
developing country effects are taken into account. For developing countries, 
the major concern is quite paradoxical regarding the relationship between 
institutions and inequality. Democratic set-ups in developing countries are 
related with rise in inequality due to transition effect. Autocracies on the other 
hand are capable of decreasing inequality. Greater integration with rest of the 
world may cause less inequality but the evidence is weak at best.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table: 1 Gini and Openness (Lcopen) 
 
 
Dependent Variables 
 
Dependent Variable : Gini 
 
(Developed + Developing) 
 
(Developing Only) 
(Developing Only) 
Minus Africa 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Openness             
Nominal Trade Shares (Lcopen) -0.49 -2.11 -4.71 -5.22 1.22 -0.59 -1.08 -0.10 1.33 -1.26 -0.93 1.09 
 (-0.2) (-0.8) (-1.6)* (-1.8)* (0.4) (-0.2) (-0.3) (-0.03) (0.37) (-0.3) (-0.2) 0.27 
Institutions             
Legal              
Rule of law(Rl) -7.30     -6.44       
 (-5.0)***     (-1.3)       
Political             
Voice and Accountability (Va)  -5.46     1.40      
  (-4.0)***     (0.5)      
Democracy (Demo)   -0.71     1.35   2.28  
   (-1.8)*     (2.4)**   (3.2)***  
Autocracy (Auto)    0.369     -1.59   -2.80 
    (0.7)     (-2.6)**   (-3.5)*** 
Economic             
Government Effectiveness (Ge)     -8.60     7.64   
     (-5.0)***     (0.9)   
             
N 95 96 89 89 89 70 71 66 66 64 44 44 
F-Statistics 13.27*** 8.96*** 3.14** 1.67 12.62*** 0.88 0.21 2.87* 3.35 0.44 5.10* 6.10 
R-Square 0.16 0.14 0.03 0.02 0.16 0.16 0.01 0.11  0.19 0.36 0.34 
             
2SLS Bias 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.208 0.000 0.000 
Sargan (p) 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.011*** 0.025** 0.000*** 0.072* 0.187 
***, **, * denotes significance at 1%, 5 % and 10% levels respectively; Standard errors corrected for as run Durbin–Wu–Hausman     test (augmented regression test) for endogeneity (see Davidson and MacKinnon. 1993) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table: 2 Gini and Trade Policy (Owti) 
 
 
Independent Variables 
 
Dependent Variable : Gini 
 
(Developed + Developing) 
 
(Developing Only) 
(Developing Only) Minus 
Africa 
 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
Trade Policy             
Tariffs on intermediate inputs and capital 
goods (Owti) 
-30.05 3.73 56.50 66.69 -48.34 -25.02 -18.61 -9.18 -12.46 -32.26 3.38 -0.69 
(-1.04) (0.2) (1.9)* (2.4)** (-1.1) (-1.1) (-1.10) (-0.5) (-0.7) (-1.1) (0.1) (-0.03) 
Institutions             
Legal  -0.45     -7.13       
Rule of law(Rl) (-3.5)***     (-1.3)       
             
Political             
Voice and Accountability (Va)  -5.80     2,61      
  (-2.0)**     (0.80)      
Democracy (Demo)   0.33     1.31   2.34  
   (0.4)     (2.2)**   (2.5)**  
Autocracy (Auto)    -1.13     -1.68   -3.01 
    (-0.9)     (-2.5)**   (-2.8)*** 
Economic             
Government Effectiveness (Ge)     -13.23     -4.01   
     (-2.8)***     (-0.58)   
             
N 70 71 68 51 68 53 54 51 51 51 34 34 
F-Statistics 17.07*** 11.80*** 3.57** 2.79* 13.57*** 0.98 1.22 2.79* 3.26** 0.64 3.16** 3.88** 
R-Square 0.18 0.18 0.59 0.15 0.48 0.45 0.11 0.15 0.22 0.40 0.06 0.52 
             
2SLS Bias 0.073 O124 0.155 0.027 0.166 0.041 0.001 0.027 0.019 0.144 0.181 0.123 
Sargan (p) 0.036** 0.000*** 0.002** 0.037** 0.028** 0.027** 0.005*** 0.038** 0.092* 0.009*** 0.185 0.336 
***, **, * denotes significance at 1%, 5 % and 10% levels respectively; Standard errors corrected for as run Durbin–Wu–Hausman     test (augmented regression test) for endogeneity (see Davidson and 
MacKinnon. 1993) 
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DATA AND SOURCES: 
 
Auto: Autocracy, Year: 1999, Source: Polity IV dataset  
 
Ctc: Control for Corruption, Year: 1997/98. Source: Kaufman et al (2002) 
 
Disteq: Distance from Equator of capital city measured as abs (Latitude)/90. Source: Rodrik, 
Subramanian & Trebbi (2002) 
 
Engfrac: Fraction of the population speaking English. Source: Rodrik, Subramanian 
& Trebbi (2002) 
 
Eurfrac: Fraction of the population speaking one of the major languages of Western 
Europe: English, French, German, Portuguese, or Spanish. Source: Rodrik, 
Subramanian & Trebbi (2002) 
 
Ge: Government Effectiveness,  Year: 1997/98. Source: Kaufman et al (2002) 
 
Lcopen: Natural logarithm of openness. Openness is given by the ratio of (nomnal) imports 
plus exports to GDP (in nominal US dollars), Year: 1985. Source: Penn World Tables, Mark 6. 
 
Logfrankrom (FR) : Natural logarithm of predicted trade shares computed following Frankel 
and Romer (1999) from a bilateral trade equation with ‘pure geography’ variables. Source: 
Frankel and Romer (1999). 
 
Owti:  Tariffs on Intermediate and Capital Goods, 1985. Source: Rose (2002) 
 
Ps: Political Stability, Year: 1997/98. Source: Kaufman et al (2002) 
 
Rl: Rule of Law, Year: 1997/98. Source: Kaufman et al (2002) 
 
Rq : Regulatory Quality, Year: 1997/98. Source: Kaufman et al (2002) 
 
Va: Voice and Accountability, Year: 1997 
 
 
 
 
 
